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This case raises the question whether there is a 14th -
amdt right to adequate treatmenf for persons civilly camnitted -in staee mental institutions. Justice Blackmun's statement 
in Jacksol1 v. Indiana that due process requires "that the 
nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable 
relationship to the purpose for which the individual is 
committed" seems to suggest that there might be, and Juage 
Wisdom drew on a considerable body of scholarly opinion in 
formulating a theoritical model 
alll that declares such a right. 
- · - --....---- --. - . . - . 
, I am inclined to await ... l!ll!~ more consideration in the 
lower courts before taking a case. The notion of defining a 




.. ., - ~ 
constitutional right by reference to some standard of medical 
care is quite troublesome to me . As medical knowledge changes 
the constitutional right would also prestnnably change. 
b,,&.CA.~'4.. 
CA 5 had a relatively easy ~aseA• •I i the difficult 
problem of defining what was "adequate" did not really 
pose a pro~lem. The court was able to treat the issue -
more or less as a malpractice "tfl.lestion and determine, by 
comparison to general medical standards,that the care provided 
here was far less than adequate. 
I would prefer to wait and see how the lower courts 
fare in defining " adequate" treatment • and implementing 
guidelines to assure that right. Wyatt v. Stickney,q1emtioned )J 
on the last page, is a case that comes closer to this problem, ~ 
but even there the parties apparently stipulated a level of 
Other cases might arise 
care that all would consider adequate .A1 --~ 
that really grapple 
A. with this pro~lem in a true adversatial 
context,and such cases would seem to provide this Court ~ 
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 





Cert to CA 5 
(Wisdom, Rives, Morgan) 
Federal/Civil 
Timely 
1. Petitioner seeks certiorari to review CA S's -
determination that . the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees 
mentally ill persons civilly corrnnitted in state mental 
--------~-------
hospitals a right to treatment, and ~hat state officials' 
intentional, malicious, and reckless disregard of that right ,---- --





Although some federal district courts recently have found 
a right of treatment for civilly committed mentally ill 
patients, see Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 
1971), 344 F. Supp. 373, appeal docketed sub~, Wyatt v. 
Aderholt, (5th Cir. Aug. 1972); Stachaulak v. Coughlin, 364 
F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973); but see Burnham v. Department 
of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, appeal docketed (5th 
Cir. Oct. 1972), this appears to be the first court of 
appeals decision reaching that conclusio; . 1 
2. Surrnnary: Respondent was civilly committed in -0 95 ~ fter having been diagnosed .a paranoid schizophrenic. 
The1udge told him that he was being sent to the hospital 
for a "few weeks" to take some new medication and that he 
was certain that respondent would be "all right" and would 
return soon. Respondent, a Christian Scientist, refused to 
submit to medication or electroshock therapy. He 
---... 
1. Additionally, Welsch v. Likins recently recognized 
a similar right on behalf of civilly committed mentally 
retarded patients. 4-72-Civ. 451, D. Minn. (Feb. 15, 1974). 
-
- -
/ I+-~ 3. 
~ was not released until 1971. 
-=------- ---------
Respondent thereafter sued five officials of the 
state mental facility, all~ging that they had ''acted in bad 
faith ... and with reckless disregard of his constitutional 
rights." The core of the charge was that two of the defendants . 
had acted intentionally and maliciously in "confining 
[respondent] against his will, knowing that [he] was not 
physically dangerous to himself or others." Three defendants 
were acquitted. Rejecting their defense that they had acted 
in good faith and reasonable belief that r espondent needed 
confinement and that the confinement was legal, the jury 
- returned a verdict of $17,000 compensatory damages and $5,000 
ce 
punitive damages against petitioner O'Connor, and $11,500 
compensatory damages and $5,000 punitive damages against -another 
defendant. Petitioner, represented by the Florida Attorney 
General, seeks certiorari to review the CA 5 affirmance of 
that verdict. 
Decision Below: CA 5 reviewed the evidence at some 
length and concluded that~ amply suf~ced to support~the 
jury verdict. This review occupies some fifteen pages of ------the CA 5 slipsheet opinion. In general terms, it indicates 
that officials devoted very little attention to respondent 
following his refusal to submit to medical or electroshock 
therapy, and that they refused repeated requests to release 





his care. CA S's view of the evidence indicated that it 
supported jury findings that the defendants unjustifiably 
withheld specific forms of treatment from respondent; 
4. 
that they recklessly failed to attend to and treat respondent 
at the precise junctures when treatment would have most ~ 
aided his recovery and release; that they wantonly, 
maliciously, or oppressively blocked efforts by responsible 
; 
organizatj>ns and friends to have him released to their 
custody; that they continued to confine him with knowledge 
or reckless disregard that he was not dangerous; and that 
' 
they failed to do the best job they could with the available 
resources. 
.. / Petitioner's appeal in the Fifth Circuit challenged 
the basis of the 1983 action, asserting that patients 
civilly con:n:nitted in state mental hospitals do not have a 
constitutional right to treatment. CA 5 concluded that the ----------- - -----
Fourteenth .Amendment provides such a right. 
CA 5 begins with the obvious proposition that civil 
con:n:nitment results in the kind of deprivation of liberty 
that gives rise to due process concerns. Relying on the 
considerable amount of scholarly work in the area, it then 
constructs a two part theory supporting the conclusion that 
persons civilly connnitted have a right to · treatment. The 





deprivations of liberty m~st be justified by some permissible 
government goal. Continuing, CA 5 identifies three distinct 
grounds for civil corrnnitment that typically are recognized 
person 
by state statutes; protection of thefcorrnnittef; protection 
of others; and recognition of the need for treatment, care, 
custody, or supervision. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 
715, 737 (1972). These basic state interests, in the opinion 
of CA 5, canj9,be categorized more broadly a~ police power 
2., ' 
rationale an parens patriae rationale. 
...,_ ___, 
CA 5 determined that confinement in this case rested 
on the parens patriae rationale that the patient was in 
4t need of treatment. In that context, due process requires 
provision of "minimally adequate" treatment lest corrnnitment 
-
on the parens patriae rationale amount to an arbitrary exercise 
of government power. ,, 
11 
The second part of the CA 5 theoretical model did not 
depend on the distinction between those corrnnitted on the parens 
patriae rationale and those corrnnitted pursuant to the state's 
police power. The court determined that in cases lacking 
the three central limitations on the state's power of 
detention -- that it ~e in retribution for a specific offense; 
that it be limited to a fixed term; and that it be permitted 
only after a proceeding where fundamental procedural safeguards 




of some quid pro quo. In this instance, the required quid pro quo 
was adequate treatment. 
Finally, CA 5 was able to avoid the argument that the M 
concept of adequate treatment lacked judicially manageable /} 
s-t;andards. It determined that the record in this case so 
clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of respondent's treatment 
that a ruling could be reached without more complicated 
formulation of the abstract notion of adequacy. 
4. Contentions: Petitioner first asserts that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not confer a right to adequate 
treatment to those civilly committed in state mental institutions. 
- The argument on this point relates in part to the absence of 
recognition of such a right in the historical evolution of 
-
' 
civil commitment. It additionally emphasizes the problems 
of defining and implementing a standard of adequate treatment. 
Petitioner additionally asserts that the Court should 
grant cert to consider whether, if a right to adequate --treatment exists, respondent waived the right by refusing to 
submit to medication and electroshock. Finally, petitioner ·------urges that physicians in state mental institutions should not 
be held liable under 1983 for any conduct other than bad 
faith or malicious deprivation of adequate treatment. 
5. Discussion: As CA 5 pointed out, the jury was 
instructed that it should not award damages for failure to 




Petitioner did not object to the instruction at trial. 
439 F. 2d at 531. This would appear to remove some of the 
force from petitioner's assertion that the Court should review 
the waiver point. Petitioner's assertion that a damage 
action should not lie for conduct other than bad-faith 
or malicious deprivation of rights has some appeal on these 
facts. The doctors. involved were clearly part of a state 
system that warehoused mental patients, and some of the 
actionable conduct appears to have taken place long before 
there was any social concern for this practice or any reason 
to foresee the evolution of an actionable constitutional 
right to adequate treatment. However, the unchallenged jury 
- instruction required a finding for petitioner if the jury found 
that his actions were taken in good faith. Moreover, CA 5 
found sufficient evidence to support an award of punitive 
-
· damages on the basis of malicious or wanton conduct. The 
major question, whether the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
persons civilly corrnnitted in state institutions a right to 
adequate treatment is a question that this Court obviously 
will have to resolve at some point in the future. This is 
a thorough and complete attempt to justify such a right, 
and the only question is whether it would be preferable to 
wait to allow other circuits to grapple with the problem 
before addressing the issue. 





There is a response. 
September 11, 1974 Boyd 
-
8. 
CA op in app. 
CA op also at 
493 F. 2d 507 
Wyatt v. Stickney, under submission in CA 5, illustrates 
another aspect of this complicated problem. There the court 
conducted hearings on the medical question of treatment and 
concluded by promulgating standards that define the 
constitutional minimum level of treatment of the civilly 
committed. 344 F. Supp. 373. 
_,,. 
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Requirement of an Appendix 
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 ~corJ. SUMMARY: The Court granted cert to CA 5 in this case to review that c ourt1 s 
~ 
~ 
ruling that the 14th Amend. guarantees persons civilly committed in state mental 
~f· hospitals a right to treatment. 
~ Petr now moves, pursuant to Rule 36(8), to be allowed to dispense with the 
])0 requirement of an Appendix and to proceed on the original record. Petr, pleading 
efficiency and economy, states that the appendix, as designated, would have to 





- 2 -- -Resp has filed a m emorandum in opposition arguing that since both parties 
intend to refer to substantial portions of the record and because the Court may 
wish to review the relevant evidence to determine the proprietary of the jury1 s 
verdict, an appendix is necessary for the conv enience of the Court. Resp notes 
that while. most of the testimony at trial will be in the appendix, there has been 
11a genuine effort by counsel for both parties to pare the record of its essenti a ls. 11 
DISCUSSION: It is possible that the parties do not understand the purposes o f 
.an appendix. Rule 36(1) sets forth certain required contents and provides for the 
inclusion of 11any other parts of the record to which the parties wish to di rect t h e 
court1 s particular attention. 11 See also Rule 17. I understand that the emphasized 
language was a carefully chosen revision to the former rules which requi red the 
parties to designate the parts of the record 11necessary 11 or 11material 11 fo r t h e 
consideration of the questions presented. Stern & Gressman at 440-41. In addition, 
Rule 36(3) admonishes that 11the parties shall have regard for the fact that the record 
on file ~ith the Clerk is always available to the court for reference and e x a m i natio n 
and shall not engage in unnecessary designation. 11 And, of course, 11the fact that 
any part of the record has not been printed shall not prevent the parties or the c ourt 
from relying on it. 11 Rule 1 7. See also Rules 26 and 29( 3 ). 
The Advisory Committee1 s Note to Rule 30(a) of the Fed. R. App. P. make s 
clear that the appendix is not to contain the entire record but merely a se lectio n 
therefrom for the convenience of the court. See Stern & Gressman at 428 n. 1. It 
does not appear that permitting the parties to proceed on the original record, or 
of reproducing the entire record in an appendix, would be in keeping with the pur-
poses and intent of the appendix method. If petr1 s motion is denied, perhaps it 
would be appropriate to invite the parties1 attention to Rule 36(3). 
The Clerk is conferring with the parties. They may reach an agreement as 




- 3 --the appendix will be reduced in size. 
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Mr. Justice Powell 
Joel Klein 
DATE: January 14, 1975 
No. 74-8 O'Connor v. Donaldson 
This is the Court's first foray into the world of civil 
commitment, an area presenting difficult and troubling problems. 
Since there is little doubt that this will not be the Court's 
sole effort in the next several years, I have written 
(hurriedly, unfortunately) a somewhat extended memorandum so 
that this case may be placed in a more general context. I 
will use the following outline: 
I. A Sketch of the Existing Situation. 
II. The Legal Pr0blems Presented 
III. My Thoughts As to Solutions 
IV. The Present Case 
I 
There are numerous people who have been and are being 
involuntarily committed to state mental hospitals. With few 
exceptions, mental patients are committed for indefinite 
periods on the basis of abbreviated legal proceedings. The 
hospitals in which they are placed are poorly situated, 
inadequately staffed, oversized and unpleasant. Often they 
are not much different from prisons and, indeed, prisons 
frequently give inmates more privileges because inmates are 




- - 2. 
Traditionally the state's power to commit is divided 
into its parens patriae power - those who need care and 
treatment - and its police power - those who are dangerous. 
Until recently most commitment statutes relied on the state's 
relatively unchallenged parens patriae power. In the past 
few years, however, and in the wake of some judicial proddings, 
at least 25% of the states have amended their statutes to 
---- -
limit confinement to those who are dangerous to themselves 
or others. ·k 
,._ 
Once in a mental hospital, a patient receives little more 
than custodial care and his daily drug dosages. On occasion, 
electroshock therapy is also given. More traditional therapies, 
such as psychotherapy, occupational therapy and behavioral 
therapy are, to a large extent, non- existent. A patient 
dissatisfied with his commitment can file a writ of habeas; 
however, the practical worth of such writs is nil since 




As a result of these circumstances numerous legal 
challenges have been filed in federal courst in recent years. 
Generally these challenges have been of £our types: 
·kTfie "danger to self" justification obviously partakes of 




- - 3. 
A. Abolition or limitation of the parens patriae power.-
Several suits have been brought challenging the state's power 
to commit people solely on the ground that such people need 
care. In short, the thrust of these cases has been that civil 
commitment is in the nature of a penal sanction and therefore 
that the state can commit, if at all, only pursuant to its 
police power. 
B. Procedural due process. - Concommitant with the 
challenge discussed in "A" above has been a claim that since 
the state may rely only upon its police power, it must provide 
criminal procedures - counsel, jury trial, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt - before it may commit someone. Some cases 
have argued that, no matter what power the state purports 
to rely on for commitment, the nature of the sanction requires 
the use of criminal procedures.* 
C. Right to treatment. - A number of suits, most notably 
Wyatt v. Aderholt, decided by district judge Frank Johnson 
and recently affirmed by CA5, have been class actions reque sting 
federal courts to impose constitutionally required mi nimum 
procedures on state hospitals. For example, federal courts 
have ordered states to achieve a certain doctor-patient ratio, 
4o adopt individual treatment plan/ s, reviewable in federal court, 
i(The issue discussed in "A" and "B" were presented in lessard 
v. Schmidt which this Court remanded last year but is now back 
up here. That case involves a three-judge court's invalidation 




- - 4. 
and to maintain certain physical conditions within the facilities. 
In general, courts have ordered such requirements for all 
patients, irrespective of whether they have been committed 
under parens patriae or police power. One question that has 
been left open in these right to treatment suits is whether 
the right is enforceable by means of habeas, damage ~ or both, 
and in what circumstances. 
D. Right to refuse treatment. - Most recently a new 
constitutional right has been claimed - the right to refuse 
treatment. In particular people have objected to the use 
of experimental therapies or extremely intrusive forms of 
treatment such as lobotomy, electroshock therapy and behavior 
modification. Obviously the co-existence of a right to 
treatment with a right to refuse treatment leads to a logical 
and administrative strain. 
III 
Given this situation, the question is: "What to do about 
it?" Before answering this, let me set forth some observations 
based on my study of this area. These observations are not 
unassailable "facts" but I do think they represent fair 
evaluations of the existing knowledge. 
A. The distinction between the police power and the 
parens patriae power is largely a red herring.* The empirical 
*I am assuming here that we · are talking about non-criminal 





- - s. 
data overwhelmingly support the following two conclusions: 
first, the incidence of dangerous behavior among the mentally 
ill - in particular, among those who are committed - is no 
greater than it is in the population at large; second, there 
is no reasonably accurate way for psychiatrists (or anyone 
else) to predict which people are dangerous. Countless ~ 
c ) ~ ~ cJI.JL,... ~ e+ , B ~~, > / 
psychiatrists have candidly admittedtTia'f[they will ~ay a 
person may be dangerous if they believe that person is "in 
need of treatment" even though they have no idea whether the 
person is dangerous. The American Psychiatric Association 
made this point in their brief in this case, acknowledging 
that dangerousness cannot be identified with any accuracy. -- -
In short, those who argue that only people who are - -dangerous should be commitable are arguing for an abolition 
of civil commitment. Hence, although there is a nice ---- ~ -
analytic distinction between parens patriae and police power, 
there is no pragmatic difference worthy of recognition.* 
*Indeed, even assuming that we could identify those who are 
mentally ill and dangerous, a serious constitutional issue 
is presented as to whether such people may be confined -
i.e. preventively detained. With respect to society at 
large we await a criminal act before confinement. Why 
then limit preventive detention to the mentally ill ? 
-
-
- - 6. 
B. People presently in non-criminal mental hospitals 
generally may be broken down into two groups. First there 
are those whom I call the "unwanteds." Usually these are 
people, such as the aged, that a particular family considers 
to be a drain and therefore has committed so as to absolve 
themselves of responsibility. (As an interesting sociological 
parenthetical, I note that the b~ akdown of family responsibility 
in this country is undoubtedly responsible for a sizeable 
portion of forced mental patients.) Second, there are nomad 
types who wander aimlessly and come into contact with the -
police, generally as vagrants, and who seem disoriented. 
Such people are taken to mental hospitals and sometimes remain 
for a long time. Some of these people have evidenced rather 
serious symptamology such as suicide attempts. 
C. There is no doubt that many, although not all, 
mental patients are capable of making many rational decisions. 
Mental illness frequently has only a sporadic and/or partial 
effect on the thought processes. Moreover, there is little 
question that at least some (or perhaps many) of those who 
are involuntarily confined could function on the outside. 
By this, I mean that they are able to take care of their 
own needs and capable of living a life that is not dependent 
upon the state for survival. 
D. Treatment in a mental hospitals is somewhat of a 
myth. Drug treatment (thorazine, etc.) is readily available 







- • 7. 
available although used less frequently. (These forms of 
treatment, however, typically do not necessitate confinement). 
Beyond these treatments, most forms of treatment are 
exceptionally costly andJ unless states are willing to increase 
their expenditur es dramatically, it will be useless to speak 
of meaningful treatment at this time. Moreover, many people 
who are mentally ill are "incurable" under present treatment 
modalities.* 
Given these "realities," I think the preferred solution, - --
and one toward which you should look in the instant case, is 
to restrict the state's power to commit involuntary mental 
..._ 
patients. Basically, what needs to be done is to limit the 
'--------' 
number of people confined and the duration of their confinement. 
First, I would require that prior to commitment the state show 
that an individual is either: (1) incapable of caring for 
himself on the outside; or (2) unable, as a result of his 
mental illness, to make a reasonable judgment as to whether 
to accept treatment. In the first circumstance, I think that 
the state may keep people as long as necessary although it 
should be under an obligation to attempt, where possible, 
to assist the person to recover so as to be able to return 
*All of this may change with the development of behavior 
modification which seems to "work" more effectively than 
traditional psvchotherapies. It is worth noting, however, 





- - 8. 
to the outside. In the second circumstance - where it is 
assumed that the person is able to function on the outside -
I think that a time restriction, such as six months, should 
be placed on the length of confinement. * Such a result will 
not have a deleterious effect. Indeed, California has enacted 
a statute placing a 90-day limit (and in many instances less) 
on the length of commitment. Reports indicate that the system 
is working rather well. One effect has been that people agree 
t o voluntarily commit themselves since they know that they 
can then leave if they so desire. 
The alternative to the approach I recommend is to allow 
things to remain as they are which I think would be unfortunate. 
At least some people who could live acceptably on the outside 
are being needlessly c~nfi~ed. And, i-nevieaely , large scale 
• h W tin cases sue as yatt v. 
I 
Aderholt, discussed above, where the federal courts get into 
the unseemly business of running state mental hospitals. 
"'-
This, in turn, no doubt will lead to extensive litigation 
(as ha~ been going on at the district court level for a number 
of years) elaborating on the right to treatment and deciding 
~ ~
when it has ~ - Moreover, at least some consideration 
must be given to the issue of what happens if treatment is 
not forthcoming: Is the patient released? Even if he cannot 
cope on the outside? 
*Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, provides some support 







Since this appears to be an intractable mess, and some-
what inevitable mf the status quo is not altered, I am 
hesitant to see the Court take a plunge into the right to 
Thus, in my view, Donaldson's case should be 
considered a "right to release" case. In that regard, it 
\ 
treatment. 
fits a more traditional mode of analysis and keeps the federal 
courts at a proper arm's distance with ~~ to state 
institutions. 
IV 
Donaldson was a fifty-year-old man at the time of his 
commitment. Prior t ~ e he had lived a reasonably normal, 
albeit not gloriou~ life. He had no criminal record and 
only a brief three month mental commitment some fourteen years 
earlier. He had a substantial work record, and had been married 
for a while and had children. He was living with his parents 
when, for reasons that are not clear in the record, his father 
sought to have him committed. At a "hearing" (of the substance 
mandated in Goss) the trial court told him that he would be 
committed only for a few months. He was placed on a locked 
ward with virtually no space to himself and with a population 
that was one-third convicted criminals. For almost fifteen 
years he frantically attempted to secure his release. He 
filed 15 habeas writs, wrote countless government officials 






- - 10. 
down efforts to secure custody by a halfway house with an 
excellent reputation andJ~ close friend who was a responsible 
citizen. After filing this suit as a class action, Dona ldson 
was released (perhaps to defeat the class action . ) Since his 
release he has functioned well and for a part of the time 
has been gainfully employed. He is now close to 70 years old. 
Under the instructions of the court in this case, the 
jury was required to find that Donaldson was not dangerous, 
would have been able to care for his basic needs on the 
outside and was receiving no treatment to speak of. On these 
facts I would hold that Donaldson had a right to be released --
i r respective of the treatment he was receiving. Indeed, if -
a psychiatrist talked with him for an hour each day for these 
fifteen years I would still 
to be released since he was -
able to live on the outside. 
'-
think he had an absolute right r 
obviously not dangerous and was ~ 
To me this is the preferred disposition of this case. 
GAS, unfortunately, did not rest on this ground. Rather 
'----- ----- --
it found that Donaldson had a right to treatment and that 
the evidence supported the jury's conc lusion that he had 
been denied that right. Nevertheless, this Court may affirm 
a decision below on the basis of a different theory. The 
critical jury instructions in this case were )first )that the 






"That the defendants confined Plaintiff against 
his will, knowing that he was not mentally ill 
or dangerous or knowing that if mentally ill he 
was not receiving treatment for his alleged 
mental illness. "·k 
11. 
This instruction is, I think, more generous than petitioner 
deserved. It does, however, allow a jury verdict for the 
'--
plaintiff solely on a finding that if Donaldson was mentally 
ill "he was not receiving treatment." Thus, the instruction -
might allow a verdict solely on the grounds of treatment and, 
therefore, compel the Court to reach that issue. There was, 
however, a second instruction: 
-~ 
"If the jury should believe •.. that the 
Defendants reasonably believed in good faith 
that detention of Plaintiff was proper for the 
length of time he was so confined then a verdict 
for Defendants should be entered even though the 
jury may find the detention to have been unlawful." 
In light of this instruction, the jury nrust have found that 
petitioner did not "reasonably believe" that Donaldson's 
detention was lawful. Hence I think you could affirm the if\ 
below on the basis of a right to release rationale. 1 J 
If you feel it is necessary to reach the treatment issue -
either because you think that, given treatment, Donaldson 
could be confined or because of the posture of the case -
I 
then I think that you should find such a right here. If -Donaldson could be confined) the state's justification must 
be treatment since no other justification is sustained by 
~",The court went on to instruct that there is a "constitutional 
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the record. This being so, Jackson v. Indiana constitutionalizes 
this requirement by requiring that "the nature and duration of 
connnitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose f or 
which the individual is connnitted." 
Petitioner implicitly accepts this analysis but argues 
nonetheless that the right to treatment is too uncertain and 
amorphous and, therefore, should not be justiciable. Although, 
as I have made clear above, I see problems with a constitutionally 
cognizable right to treatment - and a good deal of litigation 
in the wake of such a holding I think if there is no right 
to release there must be a right to treatment. Otherwise ---the states may confine someone forever on the ground that 
they are "in need of care" without any form of judicial 
intervention. I also note that numerous amici representing 
virtually all mental health professionals in this country 
agree that there is a justiciable right to treatment consisting 
of humane conditions, individual treatment plans and specific 
doctor-patient ratios. Indeed, Florida itself has enacted a 
"right to treatment" statute-;\- and if the right is statutorily 
cognizable I can hardly see how petitioner can claim it is 
non-justiciable. Finally, I note that, although psychiatry 
is not a very exact science, if it is a science at all, 
many judicial determinations - e.g., incompetency, not 
guilty by reason of insanity, etc. - turn on psychiatric 
*See also amici briefs of New Jersey and Ohio in this case 
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testimony. Thus, there is nothing novel about a right that 
rests, in part, on psychiatric judgments. 
. 
The last issue in this case is th~ question of damages.* 
If you decide the case on "release" grounds then I think there 
is no serious problem regarding "retroactive" application 
of a new constitutional right since the right to release is 
a t ypical due process right. 
Assuming, however, that the right to release in these 
circumstances is considered a new right or, alternatively, 
assuming you view this case ~ a right to treatment case, 
then I think petitioner's argument is somewhat persuasive. 
\
As a general matter I do not think that a state official 
should be held for violating/~onstitutional right that was 
not recognized at the time of his behavior. 
Nevertheless, on the facts of this case I think you could -affirm the judgment of damages for several reasons. Most 
-,\-Petitioner also claims respondent "waived" his right 
to treatment since respondent refused to accept drugs or 
electroshock on the ground that he was a Christian Scientist. 
The jury, however, was instructed, as requested by petitioner, 
that "if Plaintiff through his own actions contributed to 
the withholding of a particular form of treatment, that 
Plaintiff is not entitled to collect compensation .•• 
for the failure to give such treatment during the particular 
period or periods Plaintiff refused such treatment." In 
view of this instruction, and petitioner's failure to raise 






importantly, petitioner did not 
on retroactivity nor did he 
- 14. 
a jury instruction 
to the instructions on 
this ground. Moreover, petitioner did not raise this issue 
in CA5 (although a different defendant did raise the issue.) 
Hence) to justify reversa1; the issue would have to be 
cognizable as plain error even though it was raised in this 
Court for the first time. There are also several other 
factors worthy of note. First, t~ ju"9" ~·n truction on 
") (!}/.~ /~f) - J 
immunity, quoted above, is ~excel ] ent. It requi ed the jury 
to find that petitioner did not reasonably believe that 
he had a lawful reason for confining petitioner. Hence the 
instruction would satisfy Scheuer and your dissent in Wood. 
/second, the jury found actual malice and awarded punitive 
damages. Such a judgment is supported by the evidence since 
petitioner refused to release Donaldson to the halfway house 
and to Donaldson's friend although such release was plainly 
justified. Third, the damages awarded ($17,000 compensatory, 
$5,000 punitive) were hardly unreasonable in view of the 
duration of the confinement. Finally, if the Court rules that 
there is a right to release or to treatment in these circum-
stances, there will be no retroactivity problem in future 
cases. Thus, the argument that psychiatrists will be deterred 
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case dealing with qualified immunity. Only absolute immunity 
can provide absolute i nsurance.* 
In sum, since the Court can (perhaps should) avoid the 
retroactivity issue here since it was not raised in any court 
below, I would not decide it at this time. 
J.K. 
ss 
*I also note that Florida, itself as part of its right to 
treatment statute has created a rl.ght of recovery against 
psychiatrists subject to a qualified immunity for good 
faith. 
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No. 74-8, O'Connor v. Donaldson (1/"4?/JS-) 
I would affirm for the reasons stated herein. If you 
than I am 
are less comfortable/on the issue of damages, I would reverse 
and remand as discussed. 
Although I would affirm, I would not accept the "right to 
treatment" ration.'"i1e of eA 5. Rather, I would hold t hat~ on the 
facts of this case -- not dangerous and able to provide on the 
outside--, Donaldson was entitled to release irrespective of 
whether he was receiving treatment. This would still allow the 
states to commit people who were dangerous and people who are 
unable to care for thems elves. In this latter circlllilstance~ 
the State has a legitimate parens patriae interest in providing 
custodial care (preslllilably hlllilane), and need not provide "trea t-
ment" as a constitutional matter since the jus t ification for 
confinement is that the person needs custody. (Obviously the 
state has an interest in offering "treatment" if it is avai l able, 
but that is a question for the state.) 
Donaldson was not a person who needed custody, even though 
he may,in some psychiatric sense,have been "mentally ill." Nor, 
as the jury found, was he in any way dangerous. Hence, I would 
absolutely 
hold that the due process clause/bars his involuntary confinement. 
(He may, of course, receive treatment voluntarily, but then no 
cons:i.tutitional issue is presented as he agreed to take whatever 
is given.) 
The damages issue is more difficult. I am loathe to hold 
thi s doctor for doing what everyone else was doing at this time. 
Nevertheless, my study of the record has persuaded me that this 
doctor did not do what everyone else was doing. I think he 







Donal ~son's release knowing that it was not in the best interest 
of the patient. What little "treatment" that was available --
e.g., occupational thera py and grounds privileges -- were denied 
Donaldson even though, given his I.Q. and ability, he would 
have been a prime candidate. Indeed, wh~n Donaldson eventually 
was given a different doctor he ~eceived these benef i ts. Moreover, 
and most telling for me, when two golden opportunities were 
presented, petitiorFr'efused to allow Donaldson to go. In both 
cases -- a half way house of excellent repute and a personal 
friend -- the conditions were far _ superior to those existing 
at the state hospital, and there is little question that 
Donal dson could have been cared for adequately at either place. 
Thus, a carefully written opinion could make clear that 
doctor's are not, and will not be, liable under 1983 for 
doing the ordinary. Only when they go beyond that, and engage 
in activites that, even in the circLnnstances (Scheur),are 
wholly ~njustif ied, will the be held liable. To me this i s 
such a case. 
If you are unpersuaded, then I think you should remand the 
case so that, under proper jury instructions, Donaldson may 
-·-·-· .:::-=--.._.____ -
be given an opportunity to show that this is such a case. 
Otherwise, you would be, in effect, providing doctors a 
form of absolute innnunity whereas I think you statement of 
Scheur in Wood should apply to doctors as well as school 
Board members. 
Finally, to round the picture out, let me note how I 
would handle cases where commitment is justified -- i.e., 
where there is a showing of "dangerousness" or of "inabil ity 






should be a meaningful due process hearing. After the initial 
commitment, under the principles enunciated in Jackson v. Indiana, 
the Court could require some periodic review -- e.g. yearly --
although the Court need not establish what time is " reasonable." 
In this situation, the whole issue of habeas, and to a large 
extent , personal liability of doctors need have littl e prospective 
concern. Similarly, what happens in the interim shoul d not be 
a matter of constitutional law except where conditions are such 
---that confinement is "cruel and unus:ual." (This would obviously 
be a very limited consitutional ~nterest.) There is no 
constltutional right with respect to what happens while confined 
because: (1) with respect to the dangerou~f~ justification 
for confirrmment is the police power which[ J~~ not require a 
quid pro quo; and (2) with respect to those who are unable to 
care for hhems eli::ves, the quid 9r o quo is custody. Moreover, to 
-------
speak of treatment in such cases is a myth since we plainly 
do not know how to treat the dangerous (see recidivism rates), and 
we almost as plainly are unable to treat the senile or others 
who are unable to care for themselves. 
The present case is, as I have said , neither of the above 
situations. Thus, it seems to me the only justificatt ion for 
involuntary commitment would be some form of treatment. But 
as I prefer to let people such as Donaldson out of the hospital 
before I would let the federal courts in, I would regret a right 
to treatment and opt for what might seem to be a more expansive - - ---------
right to relea~e, but what in e f f ect will ha~ far less of -----
an impact on the states. It will only require them to be 
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Because argument was advanced and heard only ten days after the filing of 
re sp1 s brief, petr requested and obtained leave to file a Reply Brief after argument. 
The reply brief was filed February 5. 
Resp urges that the filing of the reply brief after argument prevented him from 
answering the Reply Brief during argument and he seeks leave to file the instant 






e - 2 - • DISCUSSION: Rule 41(6) provides that 11[n]o brief will be received through 
the Clerk or otherwise after a case has been argued or submitted, except upon 
special leave. 11 The· Rules do not otherwise cover this unusual situation. Re sp1 s 
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May 19, 1975 
No. 74-8, O'Connor v. Donaldson 
Dear Chief, 
In due course I shall circulate a 
dissenting opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
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The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
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May 26, 1975 
No. 74-8 O'Connor v. Donaldson 
Dear Chief: 
In view of the difficulty of the issue in this case 
(at least for me), I will await other circulations before 
deciding where I come down. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
I 
~u:p-rtuu Qiourt of t!rt ~t~ ~h:tttg 
Jfagltittghm. ~. QI. 2llffeJ!.' 
• 
June 3, 1975 
Re: No. 74-8 - O'Connor v. Donaldson 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion 
in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Ir~ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to Conference 
✓ 
June 4,' 1975 
No. 74-8 O'Connor v. Donaldson 
Responding to your memorandum of this date, perhaps I 
should make two observations. .. 
- ~ -~ :.r - ·~ -~j "",j 
~ . 
I have not yet had an opportunity to consider carefully 
either your draft opinion or Potter's dissent. In view of 
other work in progress here in my Chambers requiring my 
~ttention, it may be another couple of days at least before 
I refresh my recollection on the issues in this troublesome 
case. 
: But at least as of now, I lean towara Potter's basic 
approach - subject to reservations as to his reference to 
a standard of liability based primarily on Strickland (which 
I had hoped was focused on ~he particula~ case). 
The <llief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
f 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTI CE 
- -~u:pttntt Qf omt of tfrt ~~ .§taftg 
~as!p:nghtn. ~- QI. 21lffe'!~ 
Jun e 4, 1 975 
R e: No. 74-8 - O'Connor v. Donaldson 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: t11 
Potter's proposed dissent furnishes a possible a v enue for disposing 
of this case but it does not deal with a crucia l aspect should the Court of 
Appeals remand for a new trial. In that situat ion we should deal with the 
instruction that Donaldson had a " constitutional right" to treatment. I 
believe a majority were of the view that no such right existed. It would 
hardly be wise if a new trial were held and this instruction given anew -
if five here think it wrong. 
The opinion I drafted was by no means my " first choice" dis-
position but an effort to develop a solution acceptable to a majority. 
Meanwhile as we await reactions, I would add the following as a 
footnote to page 8 of the draft, because the issue of possible dangerous-
ness to self was not really submitted. 
_! 
Fairly read, the District Court's instructions provided 
two overlapping theories upon which the jury could base a con-
clusion that respondent's alleged failure to treat petitioner 
depriv ed him of a federally-protected right. First, the District 
Court was of the view that if petitioner were mentally ill but not 
'' dangerous to himself or others " the only justification for 
cont inued hospitalization was to provide treatment; in such 
circumstances his confinement would bear no relationship to 
its purpose unless treatment were actually prov ided. Alterna-
tively, regardless of the purpose of respondent's confinement, 
the District Court unequivocally charged that he had a consti-
tutional right to receive treatment which would give him a 
realistic opportunity to improve. In both the Court of Appeals, 
- -
- 2 -
see 493 F. 2d, at 510, and this Court petitioner has attacked 
only the broader instruction, and this refutes respondent's 
argument that we must assume that the jury found him to be 
non-dangerous. See Brief for Respondent 32. 
Moreover, although the phrase "dange rous to himself or 
others " was not defined in the District Court's instructions, the 
testimony and other evidence at trial and the arguments of the 
parties on this point make plain that for purposes of this litigation 
it referred to a propensity for violence or similar physically 
dangerous behavior rather than respondent's ability to function 
in society. Cf. United States v. Birnbaum, 373 F.2d 250, 257 
(CA 2 1967). Compare Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (CA DC 1966). 
This also seems to have been the understanding of the Court of 
Appeals. See 493 F. 2d, at 51 7, 520. Thus, even if the District 
Court's first theory is read as a qualification of the second, it is 
not correct that the jury's findings must have eliminated all of 
the 11 traditionally asserted grounds for continued confinement 
••• 
11
, ante at __ , and petitioner's challenge must be con-
fronted. 
I surely favor almost any disposition that clarifies the constitu-
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Jun e 5, 1975 
Re: No. 74-8 - O'Connor v . Donaldson 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
j 
I have some further changes prompted by current memos 
and will try to have a circulation out tomorrow..,. or Monday. 
In my view even to give tacit approval to the instruction that 
there is a "Constitutional right" to "realistically" effective treatment 
will (a) leave the instruction binding on all district judges in the 
largest circuit and (b) lead other courts to consider such an instruction 
as required. That will bring us quite a volume of business as "jackleg" 
lawyers begin to look for new fields to conquer. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
June 5, 1975 
RE: No. 74-8 O'Connor v. Donaldson 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your dissent in the above. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
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CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 5, 1975 
Re: No. 74-8, J. B. O'Connor v. Kenneth Donaldson 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
11ir' . . 
T. M • 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
•"' , ~ 
CHA"1l3ERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
-
~1qrrmtt ~111tr-t of tlrrJ..1niidt ~h,tt.s 
~i,wJri-nntou. p. (G. 20,?)1$ 
-
June 6, 1975 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 74-8, O'Connor v. Donaldson 
In response to comments, I have made the indicated changes 
in my dissent in this case. 
As to the general approach to the case: The constitutional 
problems raised by civil commitment of the mentally ill are many 
and difficult. I remain persuaded that the Court should proceed 
cautious_ly and deliberately in this area. The present case can be 
0
. . I decidedona-;arrow, though hardly trivial, ground- -i. e. that a per-~r ;> son cannot be incarcerated, without more, merely because he is 
~•~ mentally ill. · . 
~ 1/ V The next question is, of course, ,vhether the State may 
confine the mentally ill merely to facilitate treatment of their 
illnesses. My inclinatiou. is to say no, · but it is not necessary to 
reach that question here, and I . understand that some members of 
the Court, before expressing even tentati\'e views on that subject, 
would prefer ti) await a case that directly raises the issue. Thus 
my dissent leaves the question open. 
Further down the road is the question whether the State 
can confine mentally ill persons, who have committed no crime, 
merely on a p~i.on that they will act dangerously toward others. 
Here we enter the difficult area of "preventative detention" of the 
mentally ill. In what I take to be pure dictum, the Court of Appeals 
suggested that such preventive detention is constitutionally permissi-
ble, but only if treatment is provided along with confinernent. The 
-( . - -
- 2 -
constitutional arguments on all sides are novel and complicated. 
They were not joined in this case; nor was there any need to join 
them, for Donaldson was found to be non-dangerous . 
I am opposed to plunging into these extraneous issues in 
this case. In this delicate area, the Court should not act until it 
has, through the adversary process, been made fully aware of the 
conflicting arguments and practical considerations. I would there-
fore dispose of the present case on its facts. The Court of Appeals 
used the case as a vehicle for an expansive essay on the constitu-
tional law of civil commitment. This was unnecessary, and perhaps 
we should say so. But surely we should not make the same mistake. 
.,,-j .-
- ~-
' ; ,,,,,,,/ 
,, 





JK/gg b-l.U-1. - 0 
TO: 
FROM: 
No. 74-8 O'Connor v . Donaldson 
The basic difference between the Chief Justice's 
opinion and Mr . Justice Stewart's opinion is a dispute as to 
what issues are properly presented for review. The Chief - --- -.-- ,,..-. ~ 
Justice, taking an expansive view of the proceedings below, 
seeks to decide the broad question of whether an involuntarily 
confined mental patient, whether or not he is dangerous, 
has any due process right to treatment. Justice Stewart 
claims that this broad issue is not presented, and should not, 
as well as need not be decided. On Justice Stewart's reading 
of the case the only issue presented is whether a state may 
confine a mentally ill person solely on the ground tha t he 
is mentally ill, and even though he is neither a danger 
to himself or others nor is receiving treatment. Justice 
Stewart says "no" and the Chief Justice agrees. (See 2nd Draft, 
p . 8, n . 6) . In Justice Stewart's memorandum of June 9, 1975, 
he points out that his proposed resolution leaves open two 
questions: (1) whether a mentally ill person who is not 
dangerous to himself or others may be hospitalized if he is 
given treatment?, and (2) whet her a mentally ill person who 






It is this last question that has generated most of the 
heat in this case. 
2. 
In my view Justice Stewart's disposition is preferred 
for three reasons: (1) properly read the record supports 
his contention that only the narrow issue is presented; 
(2) the broad issues considered by the Chief Justice raise 
terribly difficult questions that have not been briefed in 
this case and that require more reflection; and (3) the 
Chief Justice's resolution of these broad issues is unpersuasive 
even if one agrees with his conclusions. I will address these 
points in turn and then add some general comments at the end 
which reinforce my conclusion that you should vote with Justice 
Stewart. 
1 . The critical jury instructions in this case were 
delivered by the trial court as follows: 
"You are instructed that a person who is 
involuntarily civilly committed to a mental 
hospital does have a constitutional right to 
receive such treatment as will give him a 
realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve 
his mental condition. 
Now, the purpose of involuntary hospitalization 
is treatment and not mere custodial care or punish~ 
ment if a patient is not a danger to himself or 
others. Without such treatment there is no 
justification from a constitutional standpoint 
for continued confinement unless you should also 
find that the Plaintiff wa s dangerous to either 









The Chief Justice suggests that these instructions should 
be read as alternative theories of liabil ity - that is, 
that the first instruction provides a right to treatment for 
all involuntary patients while the second instruction provides 
such a right only for those who are not dangerous . Justice 
Stewart claims that the two instructions must be read together 
and that if so read they provide that treatment need be 
given only to those who are not dangerous. Justice Stewart 
seems correct because the alternative theory of liability 
is illogical. If all patients have a right to treatment, 
whether dangerous or not, then why the limitations on the 
right in the second instruction? In view of this problem, 
and particularly in a case such as this one where the 
defendant did not object to the instructions on the grounds 
suggested by the Chief Justice, and where the evidence clearly 
supports a finding that Donaldson was not danger to himself 
or others, I would go with Justice Stewart's reading. 
This view is confirmed by the Court of Appeals although 
it did so in an admittedly confused opinion. The Court 2,f -
Appeals did say that all mental patients, dangerous or 
., .... ---- ..... ,_. 
......... ..-:a 
otherwise, have a right to treatment. But I think such a 
ruling is pure dictum as t he court itself apparently is aware. 
Only in the first part of its opinion, when it talks about 
the parens patraie power - i.~., the right to conunit for the 







Court of Appeals specifically refer to the facts of this 
case. Indeed the court explicitly states that "where, as 
i n Donaldson's case, the rationale for confinement is the 
parens patraie rationale." Thus, that court appears to have 
agreed with Justice Stewart's reading of the instruction. 
To be sure, as the Chief Justice appropriately has 
noted, the Court of Appeals went beyond the facts of this 
case and reached out for the broad issue. This is unfortunate, 
iM..o~ 
~ de:rstaud that Justice Stewart 4.: p:J.,rsui ·:rg t o eujpuL:u:e 
a footnote making clear that he in noway approves this broad 
ruling and, indeed, that because the judgment has been vacated -
on the damages question, the decision below has "no precedential 
value . " This is a rather unconventional technique but it 
l certainly cures the fear that the Court of Appeals> language in 
\ DonaJ .dson will continue to haunt us. 
2 . My view that Justice Stewart's reading of the record 
should be accepted is buttressed by the fact that this Court 
should, if possible, avoid the very difficult issues reached 
by the Chief Justice. Confinement of mentally ill people 
on the ground that they may be dangerous raises, in my view, 
some of the most difficult constitutional issues I have 
encountered. Let me make clear what the state statutes mean 
II 1 i • 
by dangerous. They do not mean people who have committed 
criminal acts; they do not mean people who have been acquitted 







incompetent to stand trial. Rather, they mean any person 
who is "predicted" to conn:nit harmful acts in the future. 
At the outset I note that this is a very strange notion in 
our society - that is, that you can confine someone who has 
done nothing unlawful simply on the ground that t wo 
psychiatrists "predict" that he will be dangerous. In short, 
this is nothing more than preventive detention. 
Such a system might make sense if indeed we could 
predict which mentally ill peopie would be dangerous. But 
the simple and undisputed fact is, as the amicus have told us 
in this case, there is no way to predict which mentally 
i~l people are dangerous. Contrary to the popular myth, 
~ -- ~~- ... .-
all the studies show that the incidence of dangerousness 
among the mentally ill is no higher than it is in the 
population at large. Moreover, after spending a year in 
California reviewing these studies, I am confident that trying 
to distinguish a dangerous mentally ill person from a non-
w~ 
dangerous one is, given the present state of the ~ an 
impossible task. 
In any case, one must also ask why we confine the mentally 
ill who are allegedly dangerous while not confining others 
in our society on the basis of predicted dangerousness. If 
two sociologists were to study ghetto teenagers and say that, 






dangerous, our society would jump and scream if those 
people were confined on the basis of that prediction. Yet 
t h is is precisely what we do with the mentally ill. 
Let me suggest that the reason we do this for 
the mentally ill is not solely because they are dangerous 
but because, hopefully with treatment, their disease will be 
cured and they will no longer be dangerous. It is on this 
ground that proponents of a right to treatment argue that if 
the allegedly dangerous mentally ill people are to be confined, 
absent a criminal act, they must be given treatment. 
These are, it seems to me, very troubling questions. 
Personally I am not sure how I would resolve them. PerbJlis 
the answer is to limit commitment to those who have actually 
committed a harmful act. In any case, these issues are barely 
touched upon in the briefs in this case, and certainly should 
not be decided without the fullest possible consideration. 
3. The Chief Justice's treatment of these issues . I 
✓ 
believj confirms my views. The Court of Appeals, as the 
n retribution 
for a specific offense; that it be limited to a fixed term; 
'~ t;-J ,;.. 
and that it be permitted after a proceeding where the fundamental 
procedures are observed." None of these conditions attach to 








But he fails even to discuss the problem of naked preventive 
deterntion. That issue simply cannot be ignored. Hence if 
you reach the dangerousness issue addressed by the Chief 
Justice I think we must candidly address this difficult issue. 
4. Besides the reasons given above for joining in 
Justice Stewart's opinion I think there are several other 
problems with the Chief Justice's approach. Most notably, 
nowhere in his opinion does he say whether O'Connor violated 
any of Donaldson's constitutional rights. It seems to me 
that unless that question is answered in the affirmative then 
there is no possible way to affirm the judgment below, as 
the Chief Justice does. O'Connor moved to dismiss the complaint ., 
for failure to state a claim. Thus, if in fact he is correct 
that he violated none of Donaldson's rights, this Court 
should reverse the district court's failure to dismiss. I 
agree with Justice Stewart that Donaldson's rights were 
violated and therefore his opinion washes. But I do not see 
how the Chief Justice can duck this basic issue . 
I also think that the Chief Justice decides an irrnnunity 
issue in a somewhat troubling way. On page 8, at n. 5 of his 
recent draft, the Chief Justice suggests that the damage 
remedy should be affirmed because the jury found malice. But, 
as we have discussed, malice must relate to the deprivation of 
constitutional rights; otherwise there is no§ 1983 action, 







who finds no constitutional deprivation, suggests that 
malice is enough. 
8 
Finally, I note that, as revised, Justice Stewart's views 
on immunity salvage much of your concerns as expressed in 
Wood v. Strickland. 
For all of t hese reasons, I strongly urge you to 
join Justice Stewart. I also add one further institutional 
concern: As the matter now stands Justice Stewart has four 
votes and the Chief Justice has only himself. Even if the 
Chief Justice gets your vote, Justice Blaclanun's vote and 
Justice Rehnquist's vote, he will still only have four since 
Justice Douglas is sure not to join him. Thus, at best the 
case will be reargued. In view of this consideration, there 
is all the more reason to join Justice Stewart. 
Joel 
•-. - -~u:prtmt <!J,1urt of tlrt ~1ritd1 .:§tatea 
';NlanI1i:ngton, gl. <!J. 20,GJ~,g / 
CHAMB ERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WH ITE 
l 
June 10, 1975 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 74-8 - O'Connor v. Donaldson 
It is clear enough to me that this case was tried on 
the basis that there was a right to treatment and that a 
major issue was whether respondent was being treated. The 
Chief Justice is surely correct that the instructions 
informed the jury that there was a right to treatment; and 
although there may be other bases for liability within the 
boundaries of the instructions, as the case comes to us from 
the Court of Appeals, the judgment against petitioner rests 
firmly on the breach of duty to treat respondent. 
There is thus much to be said for deciding the right 
to treatment issue -- unless we are foreclosed from decid-
ing it or may rationally avoid it. As to the latter 
question, there is no issue here as to treatment for those 
who are dangerous to others or to themselves (broadly 
defined to include those who cannot take care of themselves); 
for it appears to be admitted that respondent is not in this 
category. This leaves those persons, such as respondent, who 
are mentally ill but not dangerous to themselves or others. 
Potter says that whether or not respondent had a right to be 
treated, no treatment was given and respondent therefore 
should have been released since the State may not confine a 
person against his will solely because he is mentally ill. 
So far I agree with him. But it should be understood that 
his opinion decides that nondangerous, mentally ill pers ons 
who a~~!19.t.. _be~I}_g _treated must be released and that in this 
sense -Potteraealswi.1:fithe right to treatment issue -- at 
least he is not disagreeing with the Court of Appeals' pro-
nouncemen t insofar as persons in respondent's situation are 
,. .  - - 2- -
concerned. I do not disagree with respect to that area 
either, for if the State may confine solely for treatment, 
i t should treat or release. 
The difficulty is that if there is to be a new trial, 
as I think there should be, at least to determine whether 
petitioner knew or should have known that he was violating 
r espondent's constitutional rights, it is essential that 
the jury be properly instructed as to what respondent's 
I 
c onstitutional rights were and are. On this point, I agree 
with the Chief Justice that the trial court's instructions 
on the right to treatment were in some respects unsatisfac-
tory and that they should not be repeated at trial. 
· This leads me to the question whether a State may 
confine a nondangerous, mentally ill person solely for 
treatment purroses. If it may not do so, there woulctbe no 
r~ t issue in this case; the issue would be. ? p 
solely whether petitioner -- mentally ill, but admittedly v, 
no t d angerous to himself or others -- knew or should have 
known that confining respondent involuntarily violated his 
constitutional rights whether or not treatment was furnished . 
/ 
I would thus prefer to decide one of the questions Potter 
l eaves open, namel¼whether a State ma confine a nondan er-
ous person solel for therapy. y vote at t econ erence was 
t e Sae may not o so. Otherwis~ I shall remain where 
Brother Stewart has · left me. 
(,efuU . R.W. 
I 
I 
CHAM BERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -.§nprtntt <qom-t .of tfyt 'J[nittt ,§:::tlt~ 
~as!rmghrn. ~ - (q. 2!Tffe;!.? 
June 9, 1975 
Re: No. 74-8 - O'Connor v . Donaldson 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
We have all recognized from the outset that this is a most difficult 
case. If, as Potter suggests, the Court of Appeals had adopted a strained 
reading of the District Court's i n structions in order to write an es say re -
garding the supposed constitutional riglt-to-treatment, I would be with the 
first to agree that we should emphatically disapprove of its opinion and 
decide this case on a narrower ground. However, after repeatedly going 
ove r the record, I ~ ,_i_n_ c_o_n_v_i~-c ed ____ t_h_a_t _t_h_e_ C_ o_u_r_t_ o_f_A__,p'-'p~e_a_l_s_'_in_te_ r ..._p-=-r_e_t_a-
tion of the instructions is correct . Thus, while I am open to some other 
disposition w ich would not only vacate that court's judgment but leave 
no doubt that the opinion is 11washed out, 11 I continue t o believe that we 
n 
risk dis service to courts faced with claims such as respondent's if we do 
not decide the right-to - treatment question . Admittedly , this aspect i s 
complicated by the miserable performance of defense counsel -- so bad 
as to be almost a denial of due process . ---The District Court' instructions, regarding the constitutional 
question in this case are reproduc d in full and in proper sequence at 
page 5 of my initial draft. Th~ t (respondent's proposed instruction 
No. 37 ) was represented by four omission dots at page 5 of the dissent, 
but could not be more unequivocal in stating_!__hat there is a constitutional 
ri ht to effective psychiatric treatment for any involuntarily confined 
mental patient. The secon instruction, which was taken substantially 
~
from respondent's proposed instruction No. 38, does not purport to 
qualify the first in any way . Specifically, it certainly does not state that 
petitioner and his co-defendants had no constitutional obligation to treat 
respondent if he were 11 dangerous to himself and others 11 ; in those cir -
cumstances they simply had no constitutional obligation to release him. 
It seems to me that both the language of these instructions and the order 
, .. , 
' •
~ - -
in w hic h they were giYen ::.-efute the :1otion that the fir s t merely 11 defined11 
the tr eatment to which respondent may have been entitled under the second . 
See D iss ent , at Sa, n . 8 . The mos t plaus ible interpretat i on i s that 
) 
elaborated upon in footnot e 6 of my se c ond d r a ft, namely, that the Dist rict 
Court was instructing the jury on alternative, albe it overlapping, theories 
of liability . 
This interpretation i s reinforced by the D i s trict Court's comments 
to t h e parties prior to giving i ts cha r g e to the ju r y . Not surprisingly, 
respondent proposed a number of i n stru cti ons relating t .o the constitutional 
question in this case. One of them, No. 40, stated in pertinent part: 
11 Even if a p e rson h as been lawfully committed to a mental hospital, he 
retains the right, inside ·the hospital, to receive adequate treatment. 11 
The D ist r ict C our t refused this i n stru c t ion on the g round that it was 
11 adequ a tely cov ered . 11 Tr . , at 705 . Similarly, respondent's proposed 
instruct ion No. 4l(b) stated: 
11 1£ you believe that defendants withheld psychiatric treat -
men t from plaintiff , or allowed his confinement to continue 
know ing that he was not receiving adequate treatment, you may 
find that his confinement was illegal under the federal constitu -
tion and the Civil Rights Act. 11 (Emphasis supplied . ) 
The District Court also refused this instruction, saying: 11 It is covered. 
It is covered by No. 37 and No. 38 . 1 1 Ibid. 
I
~ In my view, these comments and actions leave little room to doubt 
that the District Court intended to instruct the jury that respondent's con-
stitutional rights had been violated either if the doctors withheld treatment 
from him or, if respondent was not dangerous, refused to release him 
although knowing that he was not being treated. Petitioner has challenged 
only the first of these theories, and it was the one with which the Court 
of Appeals was concerned. 
In any event, as foo t note 6 of my second draft states, the record 
in this case makes abundantly clear that in the context of this litigation 
the term 11 dangerou s 1 ' meant physically dangerous . The expert and other 
testimony at trial used the term in this sense, the Court of Appeals did 
as well, and the parties have perpetuated this usage in their briefs to this 
Court. Thus, even assuming that the second of the District Court 1 s in -









jury necessar ily eliminated all of the t raditional justifications for civil 
l 
commitme nt. The que stion w h ether : here is a con~ tutional righ t - t o-
treatment in the abs e n ce of pli s i cal dan erousness must therefore b e 
confronte d and , i n parsing the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, is 
dealt w ith in Part III.A. of my i n itial draft. 
In short, the question whether there is a constitutional r ight - to -
treatment is fairly presented by t h is case a n d that we relieve ou rselve s 
of no difficult problems, and inde e d will cre ate serious problems , by 
brushin g i tunder the rug, unless, as suggested above,we make clear 
that the op inion approving such instruction is no longer a valid holding 
of the Court of Appeals.* I At the very least, if this case is eventually 
l remanded for a new trial - - and the terms of Potter's proposed disposi-tion make t h at a genuine possibility -- the need for " washing out11 the opinion will be very real. 
Our " hang up, 11 it seems to me, is the proper disposition of this 
specific litigation. As I stated in my memorandum to the Conference 
of last Wednesday, the one proposed in my present draft is not by any 
means my first choice and I am perfectly willing to consider alternatives 
li\ so long as they make clear that the Court of A peals' opinion is not to 1 be cons1 ered precedent or the law of this case. If such a disposition can be eveloped, I can go along with a remand. Otherwise, I believe 




Among (and within) the circuits there are differing views 
regarding the precedential effect of opinions vacated on other grounds. 
P. S. The second draft of the opinion is " on the presses." 
,r 
''"-! 
- • j;itpTmtt {qcmi cf tlf t 'Jllmttb ~mft5 
~MJrhtghm. ~. (!} 20pJ!., 
CH A M B E RS O F" 
.JU S TI CE POTT ER STEWART 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 74-8, O'Connor v. Donaldson 
June 10, 1975 l,)-; 
iV 1-,t~ 
I propose to add the following footnote to my dissenting 
opinion in this case, at the end of the final sentence: 
15. The opinion of the Court of Appeals unnec-
essarily expresses views on difficult issues of consti-
tutional law not presented by this case -- for example, 
whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves 
or others have a right to treatment upon confinement by 
the State. Our decision to vacate the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive that court's opinion of ~ w 
all precedential effect and leave this Court's decision 
as the sole law of the case. Cf. United States v. Mun- , 
singwear, 340 U.S. 36. -- • 
Upon remand, the Court of Appeals would be free 
to consider only the question whether O'Connor should 
be held liable for monetary damages for violating Donald 
son's constitutional right to liberty. The jury found, on 
substantial evidence and adequate instructions, that 
there was such a violation, and that finding needs no 
further · consideration. If the Court of Appeals holds 
that a remand to the district court is necessary, the oruy 
issue to be determined in that court would be wheth~il 
O'Connor is immune from liability for monetary daix{ages. 
P. S. 
CHAMBERS O F 
THE C HIEF JUSTIC E 
- -.;§u.prtm.t ~curl l1f tJrt ~b .§tafts-
~ a.s fyhtgfun. ~. C!J. 211,;i-'!~ 
June 6 , 1 9 75 
R e: 74 -8 - 0 ' Co nnor v . D onald son 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CON FERENCE: 
=. 
A revised draft of the above is at the printer. 
That, with a response to Potter's June 6 dissent, will 




JUSTICE W ILLIAM 0 . DOUG L AS 
- u.pi-~ ('Jonrl of t4t 'Jltnitt~ $5faftg -
:.a.s!ringfon, IO. QJ. 20ffeJ!-~ 
June 11, 1975 
Re: No. 74-8 - O'Connor v. Donaldson 
Dear Potter: 
/ 
Please join me. Since Bill Brenn':1 Byron, Thurgood, 
and Lewis have already joined you, isn t your dissent 
the basis for the Court opinion? If so, to avoid any 
delay at this late hour, and if, as I assume, it is my 
task formally to assign the opinion for the Court, I 
assign, of course, to you. 
Sincerely, 
W.O.D. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
- -
June 11, 1975 
No. 74-8 O'Connor v. Donaldson 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -.S.1"'1Tt-...,.,., ,< (: ,._,... ;. ,.;: th,-~~,~ ... ~ £·+-'A"" 
~ . ...,..,... ................. ,.,. ........... -- .... , c--·-..:J e--~ ... 
":--.,.,...,..._, . ~ ..... - - ,,... ,.,. ..... - , ~ cV=1:fUl.f.._., ..... ~- "-: · ...:.v~;!l,=7 
June 11, 1975 
Re: 74-8 - 0 1 Connor v. Donaldson 
MEMORANDUM TO. THE CONFERENCE: 
Potter seems to have four and a fraction votes 
(with Bi 11 Douglas not voting), and I am happy 
to have him try his hand at an opinion. As I 
stated, I can go a long with a- remand, but the 
opinion must explain how a new trial can be 
confined to the immunity issue. Also can we 
avoid passing on the correctness of the right-
to-treatment issue in view of the CAS opinion 







June 11, 1975 
No. 74-8 O'Connor v. Donaldson 
Dear Chief: 
Having now reviewed carefully everything that has been 
circulated, I have concluded that this case properly can be 
decided on the narrow ground that a state may not confine 
a mentally ill person solely because of his illness, absent 
danger to himself oro others. As I read the circulations, 
you and Potter are of one mind on this issue. 
Your opinion, however, proceeds to address the broader 
issue of whether - and under what circumstances - there may 
be a constitutional right to treatment. You make a 
persuasive argument that the broader issue may be reached 
in this case, but I remain unconvinced that it must be 
reached. If I am correct in this, there are persuasive 
prudential reasons for deferring decision until we have the 
question in sharp focus and adequately briefed and argued. 
It also seems to me that footnote 15, which Potter 
proposes to add, would make it abundantly clear - indeed 
painfully so to my Fifth Circuit - that the decision below 
will have no precedential effect. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
' 














To: ~~h~ ~~;,+,:c-· r,/;~~1 
llr. Jt;.f' :: 1 C" ~Jn I 
14r. Justice \~·:11 te 
Mr. Justice Earshall 
)lr . Justice Blackmun 
~ Justice Powell 
Kr. Justice Rehnquist 
From: Stewart, J . 
Circulated: JUN 1 '3 1975 
Recirculated: ______ _ 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals 




MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The respondent, Kenneth Donaldson, was civilly committed 
to confinement as a mental patient in the Florida State Hospital at Chatta-
hoochee in January of 1957. He was kept in· custody there against his will 
for nearly 15 years. The petitioner, Dr. J. B. O'Connor, was the hos-
pital's superintendent during most of this period. Thro;.1ghout his con-
finement Donaldson repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, demanded his release, 
claiming that he was dar1gerous to no one, that he was not mentally ill, 
and that, at any rate, the hosp ital was not providing treatment for his 
supposed illness. Finally, in February of 1971, Donaldson brought this 
lawsuit under 42 U.S . C. § 1983, in the 'United States District Court for 
- -
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the Northern District of Florida, alleging that O'Connor, and other members 
of the hospital staff, named as defendants, had intentionally and maliciously 
deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty .. l/ After a four day 
trial, the jury returned a verdict awarding both compensatory and punitive 
damages against O'Connor and a co-defendant. The Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment, 493 F. 2d 507. We granted O'Connor's 
petition for certiorari, 419 U.S. 894, because of the important constitu-
tional questions seemingly presented. 
I. 
Donaldson's commitment was initiated by his father, who thought 
thathis son was suffering from "delusions." After hearings before a county 
judge of Pinellas County, Florida, Donaldson was found to suffer from 
"paranoid schizophrenia" and was committed for "care, maintenance, and 
treatment" pursuant to now-repealed Florida statutory provisions .2/ 
The state law was less than clear in specifying the grounds necessary for 
commitment, and the record is scanty as to Donaldson's condition at the 
time of the judicial hearing. The matter is, however, irrelevant, for this 
case involves no challenge to the initial commitment, but instead involves 
the nearly fifteen years of confinement that followed. 
- -
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The evidence at the trial showed that the hospital staff had the 
power to release a patient, not dangerous to himself or others, even if 
3/ 
he remained mentally ill and had been lawfully committed.- Despite 
many requests, O'Connor refused to allow that power to be exercised 
in Donaldson's case. At the trial, O'Connor indicated that he had be-
lieved that Donaldson would have been unable to make a "successful ad-
justment outside the institution," but could not recall the basis for that 
conclusion. O'Connor retired as superintendent shortly before this suit 
was filed. A few months thereafter, and before the trial, Donaldson 
secured his release and a judicial restoration of competency, with the 
support of the hospital staff. 
The testimony at the trial demonstrated, without contradiction, 
that Donaldson had posed no danger to others during his long confinement, 
or indeed at any point in his life. O'Connor himself admitted to having 
no personal or second hand knowledge that Donaldson had ever committed 
a dangerous act. There was no evidence that Donaldson had ever been 
suicidal or likely to inflict injury upon himself. O'Connor's co-defendants 
conceded that Donaldson could have earned his own living outside the 
hospital. He had done so for some fourteen years before his commitment, 
and immediately upon his release he secured a responsible job in hotel 
administration. 
- -74-8, O'Connor v. Donaldson 
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Furthermore, Donaldson's frequent requests for release had 
been supported by responsible persons willing to provide him any care 
he might need on release. In 1963, for example, a representative of 
Helping Hands, Inc. a half-way house for mental patients, wrote O'Connor 
asking him to release Donaldson to its care. The request was accom-
panied by a supporting letter from the Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry 
and Neurology, which a defense witness conceded was a "good clinic." 
O'Connor rejected the offer, replying that Donaldson could be released 
only to his parents. That rule was apparently of O'Connor's own making. 
At the time, Donaldson was 55 years old, and, as O'Connor knew, Donald-
son's parents were too elderly and infirm to take responsibility for him. 
Moreover, in his continuing correspondence with Donaldson's parents, 
O'Connor never informed them of the Helping Hands offer. In addition, 
on four separate occasions between 1964 and 1968, John Lembcke, a college 
classmate of Donaldson and a long-time family friend, asked O'Connor 
to release Donaldson to his care. On each occasion O'Connor refused. 
The record shows that Lembcke was a serious and responsible person, 
who was willing and able to assume responsibility for Donaldson's welfare. 
The evidence showed that Donaldson's confinement was a simple 
regime of enforced custodial care, not a program designed to alleviate 
or cure his supposed illness. Numer~rns witnesses, including one of 
- -
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O'Connor's co- defendants, testified that Donaldson had received nothing 
but custodial care while at the hospital. O'Connor described Donaldson's 
treatment as "milieu therapy." But witnesses from the hospital staff 
conceded that, in the context of this case, "milieu therapy" was a euphe-
mism for confinement in the "milieu" of a mental hospital.~ For sub-
stantial periods, Donaldson was simply kept in a large room that housed 
sixty patients, many of whom were under criminal commitment. Donald-
son's requests for ground privileges, occupational training, and an oppor-
tunity to discuss his case with O'Connor or other staff members were 
routinely denied. 
At the trial, O'Connor's principal defense was that he had acted 
in good faith and was therefore immune from any award of damages. 
His position, in short, was that state law, which he had believed valid, 
had authorized indefinite custodial confinement of the "sick," even if they 
were not given treatment and their release could harm no one. _i_/ 
The trial judge instructed the members of the jury that they should 
find that O'Connor had violated Donaldson's constitutional right to liberty 
if they found that he had 
"confined [Donaldson] against his will, knowing that he 
was not mentally ill or dangerous, or knowing that if 
- -
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mentally ill he was not receiving treatment for his mental 
illness ... 
. . . . . 
"Now the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treat-
.ment and not mere custodial care or punishment if a 
patient is not a danger to himself or others. Without 
such treatment there is no justification from a consti-
tutional standpoint for continued confinement unless you 
should also find that [Donaldson] was dangerous either 
6/ 
to himself or others."-
The trial judge further instructed the jury that O'Connor was immune 
from damages if he 
"reasonably believed in good faith that detention of 
[Donaldson] was proper for the length of time he was 
so confined . . . . 
. . . . . 
"[But] mere good intentions which do not give rise to 
a reasonable belief that detention is lawfully required 
cannot justify [Donaldson's] confinement in the Florida 
State Hospital." 
- -
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The jury returned a verdict for Donaldson against O'Connor and a co-
defendant, and awarded damages of $38, 500, including $10, 000 in pun-
·t· d 7 / 1 1ve amages .-
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District 
Court in a broad opinion dealing with "the far-reaching question whether 
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to treatment to persons 
involuntarily civilly committed to state mental hospitals." 493 F. 2d, at 
509. The appellate court held that when, as in Donaldson's case, the 
rationale for confinement is that the patient is in need of treatment, the 
Constitution requires that minimally adequate treatment in fact be pro-
vided. Id., at 521. The court further expressed the view that, regardless 
of the grounds for involuntary civil commitment, a person confined against 
his will at a state mental institution has "a constitutional right to receive 
such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to 
be cured or to improve his mental condition." Id., at 520. Conversely, 
the court's opinion implied that it is constitutionally permissible for a 
State to confine a mentally ill person against his will in order to treat 
his illness, regardless of whether his illness renders him dangerous to 
himself or others. ~ ~dl. -) J S;).a -Sd--t. 
- -
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II. 
We have concluded that the difficult issues of constitutional 
law dealt with by the Court of Appeals are not presented by this case 
in its present posture. Specifically, there is no reason now to decide 
whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others have 
a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the State, or whether 
the State may compulsorily confine a nondangerous, mentally ill individ-
ual for the purpose of treatment. As we view it, this case raises a 
single, relatively simple, but nonetheless important question concern-
ing every man's constitutional right to liberty. 
The jury found that Donaldson was neither dangerous to him-
self nor dangerous to others, and also found that, if mentally ill, Donald-
son had not received treatment .JU' That verdict, based on abundant evi-
dence, makes the issue before the Court a narrow one. We need not de-
cide whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may 
be confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary 
statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement of such 
a person--to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own survival or 
safety,~ or to alleviate or cure his illness. See Jackson v. Indiana, 
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406 U.S. 715, 736-737; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509. For 
the jury found that none of the above grounds for continued confinement 
10/ 
was present in Donaldson's case.--
Given the jury's findings, what was left as justification for 
keeping Donaldson in continued confinement? The fact that state law 
may have authorized confinement of the harmless mentally ill does not 
itself establish a constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement. 
See Jackson v. Indiana, supra, at 720-721; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent 
Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 248-250. Nor is it enough that Donaldson's 
original confinement was founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis, 
if in fact it was, because even if his involuntary confinement was initially 
permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer 
existed. Jackson v. Indiana, supra, at 738; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent 
Institution, supra. 
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's locking 
a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial 
confinement. The term "mental illness" is notoriously vague and variable._!_.!/ 
To permit incarceration upon a criterion with such uncertain dimensions 
invites evils too obvious to require cataloguing. See Papachristou v. 
- -
74-8, O'Connor v. Donaldon 
- 10 -
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156. But even assuming that the term 
could be given a reasonably precise content and that the ''mentally ill" 
could be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is no constitutional 
basis for confining such persons against their will if they are dangerous 
to no one and can live safely in freedom. 
May the State confine the mentally ill merely to ensure them 
a living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private community? 
That the State has a proper interest in providing care and assistance to 
its unfortunate citizens goes without saying. But the mere presence of 
mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to 
the comforts of an institution. Moreover, while the State may arguably 
confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever 
a necessary condition for raising the living standards of those capable 
of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of family 
or friends. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90. May the State 
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fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from ex-
posure to those whose ways are different? One might as well ask if the 
State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically 
unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity 
cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty. 
See, e. g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21; Coates v. City of 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 61 1, 615; Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592; 
cf. United States Dept. of Agric. v. Morenoz 413 U.S. 528, 534. 
In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more 
a nondangerous individual who is capable of caring for himself or who 
has -responsible family members or friends willing and able to care for 
him. Since the jury found, upon ample evidence, that O'Connor, as an 
agent of the State, knowingly did so confine Donaldson, it properly con-
cluded that O'Connor violated Donaldson's constitutional right to freedom. 
III. 
O'Connor contends that in any event he should not be held per-
sonally liable for monetary damages because his decisions were made 
in "good faith." Specifically, O'Connor argues that he was acting pursuant 
to state law which, he believed, authorized confinement of the mentally 
' ill even when their release would not compromise their safety or constitute 
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a danger to others, and that he could not reasonably have been expected 
to know that the state law as he understood it was constitutionally invalid. 
A proposed instruction to this effect was rejected by the District Court. B_/ 
The District Court did instruct the jury, without objection, that 
monetary damages could not be assessed against O'Connor if he had be-
lieved reasonably and in good faith that Donaldson's continued confinement 
was "proper, " and that punitive damages could be awarded only if O'Connor 
had acted "maliciously or wantonly or oppressively." The Court of Appeals 
approved those instructions. But that court did not consider whether it 
was error for the trial judge to refuse the additional instruction concerning 
O'Connor's claimed reliance on state law authorization for Donaldson's 
continued confinement. Further, neither the District Court nor the Court 
of Appeals acted with the benefit of this Court's most recent decision on 
the scope of the qualified immunity possessed by state officials under 42 
U.S. C. § 1983. Wood v. Strickland, __ U.S. __ 
Under that decision, the relevant question for the jury is whether 
O'Connor "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took 
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional 
rights of [Donaldson], or if he took the action with the malicious intention 
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to [Donaldson].'' 
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Id. __ . See also, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48; Wood v. 
Strickland, supra, at ___ (opinion of Powell, J. ). For purposes of 
this question, an official has, of course, no duty to anticipate unforesee-
able constitutional developments. Wood v. Strickland, supra, at --
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
and remand the case to enable that court to consider, in light of Wood 
v. Strickland, whether the District Judge's failure to instruct on the 
effect of O'Connor's claimed reliance on state law rendered inadequate 
the instructions given on O'Connor's liability for compensatory and punitive 
damages .El 
It is so ordered. 
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1/ 
- Donaldson's original complaint was filed as a class action 
on behalf of all patients in his department of the Florida State Hospital 
at Chattahoochee. In addition to a damage claim, Donaldson's com-
plaint also requested habeas corpus relief directing his release, as well 
as the release of all members of the class. Donaldson further sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the hospital to provide adequate 
psychiatric treatment. 
After Donaldson's release and after the District Court dismissed 
the action as a class suit, Donaldson filed an amended complaint, repeating 
his claim for compensatory and punitive damages. Although the amended 
complaint retained the prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief, that 
request was eliminated from the case prior to trial. See Donaldson v. 
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 512-513. 
2/ 
- The judicial commitment proceedings were pursuant to a 
state statute which provided: 
"Whenever any person who has been adjudged mentally 
incompetent requires confin~ment or restraint to prevent self-
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injury or violence to others, the said judge shall direct that 
such person be forthwith delivered to the superintendent of 
the Florida state hospital, for care, maintenance, and treat-
ment, as provided in §§ 394. 09, 394. 24, 394. 25, 394. 26 and 
394. 27, or make such other disposition of him as he may be 
permitted by law." 
14 A Fla. Sta t. § 394. 22 (ll)(a) (West 1960). 
Donaldson had been adjudged "incompetent" several days earlier 
under § 394. 22(1), which provided for such a finding as to any person 
who was 
"incompetent by reason of mental illness, sickness, drunken-
ness, excessive use of drugs, insanity, or other mental or 
physical condition, so that he is incapable of caring for himself 
or managing his property, or is likely to dissipate or lose his 
property or become the victim of designing persons, or inflict 
harm on himself or others. . . . " 
It would appear that § 394. 22(ll)(a) contemplated that invol-
untary commitment would be imposed only on those "incompetent" persons 
who "require[ d] confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence 
to others." But this is not certain, for the statute further provided that 
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the judge could adjudicate the person a "harmless incompetent" and release 
him to · guardian upon a finding that he did "not require confinement or 
restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others and that treatment 
in the Florida state hospital is unnecessary or would be without benefit 
to such person .... " § 394. 22(11)(b) (emphasis added). In this regard, 
it is noteworthy that Donaldson's "Order for Delivery" to the Florida State 
Hospital provided that he required "confinement or restraint to prevent 
self-injury or violence to others, or to insure proper treatment." (Em-
phasis added.) At any rate, the Florida commitment statute apparently 
provided no judicial procedure whereby one still incompetent could secure 
his release on the ground that he was no longer dangerous to himself or 
others. 
Whether the Florida statute provided a "right to treatment" 
for involuntarily committed patients is also open to dispute. Under 
§ 394. 22(11 )(a), commitment "to prevent self-injury or violence to others" 
was "for care, maintenance, and treatment." Recently Florida has totally 
revamped its civil commitment law and now provides a statutory right to 
receive individual medical treatment. 144 Fla. Stat. Ann§ 394.459 (1972). 
- -
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3/ 
- The sole statutory procedure for release required a judicial 
reinstatement of a patient's "mental competency." 14 A Fla. Stat. § 394. 22 
(15) & (16) (West 1960). But this procedure could be initiated by the 
hospital staff. Indeed, it was at the staff's initiative that Donaldson was 
finally restored to competency, and liberty, almost immediately after 
O'Connor retired from the superintendency. 
In addition, witnesses testified that the hospital had always 
had its own procedure for releasing patients--for "trial visits," "home 
visits," "furloughs," or "out of state discharges"--even though the patients 
had -not been judicially restored to competency. Those conditional re-
leases often became permanent, and the hospital merely closed its books 
on the patient. O'Connor did not deny at trial that he had the power to 
release patients; he conceded that it was his "duty" as superintendent of 
the hospital "to determine whether that patient having once reached the 
hospital was in such a condition as to request that he be considered for 
release from the hospital. " 
4/ 
- There was some evidence that Donaldson, who is a Christian 
Scientist, on occasion refused to take medication. The trial judge instructed 
the jury not to award damages for any period of confinement during which 
Donaldson had declined treatment. 
- -
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5/ 
- At the close of Donaldson's case-in-chief, O'Connor 
moved for a directed verdict on the ground that state law at the time 
of Donaldson's confinement authorized institutionalization of the mentally 
ill even if they posed no danger to themselves or others. This motion 
was denied. At the close of all the evidence, O'Connor asked that the 
jury be instructed that "_if the defendants acted pursuant to a statute which 
was not declared unconstitutional at the time, they cannot be held account-
able for such action." The District Court declined to give this requested 
instruction. 
6/ 
- The District Court defined treatment as follows: 
"Your are instructed that a person who is involun-
tarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does 
have a constitutional right to receive such treat-
ment as will give him a realistic opportunity to 
be cured or to improve his mental condition." 
(Emphasis added.) 
O'Connor argues that this statement suggests that a mental patient has 
a right to treatment even if confined by reason of dangerousness to him-
self or others. But this is to take the above paragraph out of context, for 
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it is bracketed by paragraphs making clear the trial judge's theory that 
treatment is constitutionally required only if mental illness alone, rather 
than danger to self or others, is the reason for confinement. If O'Connor 
had thought the instructions ambiguous on this point, he could have ob-
jected to them and requested a clarification. He did not do so. We 
accordingly have no occasion here to decide whetrer persons committed 
on grounds of dangerousness enjoy a "right to treatment." 
In pertinent part; the instructions read as follows: 
"The Plaintiff claims in brief that throughout the period of his 
hospitalization he was not mentally ill or dangerous to himself, and claims 
further that if he was mentally ill, or if Defendants believed he was 
mentally ill, Defendants withheld from him the treatment necessary to 
improve his mental condition. 
"The Defendants claim, in brief, that Plaintiff's detention was 
legal and proper, or if his detention was not legal and proper, it was 
the result of mistake, without malicious intent. 
"In order to prove his claim under the Civil Rights Act, the 
burden is upon the Plaintiff in this case to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence in this case the following facts: 
"That the Defendants confined Plaintiff against his will, know-
ing that he was not mentally ill or dangerous, or knowing that if mentally 
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ill he was not receiving treatment for his mental illness. . . . 
" [T]hat the Defendants' acts and conduct deprived Plaintiff of 
his Federal Constitutional right not to be denied or deprived of his liberty 
without due process of law as that phrase is defined and explained in these 
instructions . . . . 
"You are instructed that a person v.ho is involuntarily civilly 
committed to a mental hospital does have a constitutional right to receive 
such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to be cur.ed or to 
improve his mental condition. 
" Now the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment 
and not mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not a danger 
to himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justification 
from a constitutional standpoint for continued confinement unless you 
should also find that the Plaintiff was dangerous either to himself or 
others." 
7/ 
- The trial judge had instructed that punitive damages should 
be awarded only if "the act or omission of the Defendant or Defendants 
which proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff was maliciously or wan-
torlly or oppressively done." 
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8/ 
- Given the jury instructions, see note 6 supra, it is possible 
that the jury went so far as to find that O'Connor knew that Donaldson 
was not only harmless to himself and others but also that he was not 
mentally ill at all. If it so found, the jury was permitted by the instruc-
tions to r~e against O'Connor regardless of the nature of the "treatment" 
provided. If we were to construe the jury's verdict in that fashion, there 
would remain no substa11tial issue in this case: That a wholly sane and 
innocent person has a constitutional right not to be physically confined by 
the State when his freedom will pose a danger neither to himself nor to 
others cannot be seriously doubted. 
9/ 
- The judge's instructions used the phrase "danger to himself." 
Of course, even if there is no foreseeable risk of self-injury or suicide, 
a person is literally a "danger to himself" if for physical or other reasons 
he is helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom either through his own 
efforts or with the aid of willing family members or friends. While it 
might be argued that the judge's instructions could have been more detailed 
on this point, O'Connor raised no objection to them, presumably because 
the evidence clearly showed that Donaldson was not a "danger to him-
self" however broadly that phrase might be defined. 
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10/ 
-- O'Connor argues that, despite the jury's verdict, the Court 
must assume that Donaldson was receiving treatment sufficient to justify 
his confinement, because the adequacy of treatment is a "nonjusticiable" 
question that must be left to the discretion of the psychiatric profession. 
That argument is unpersuasive. Where "treatment" is the sole asserted 
ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest 
that the courts are powerless to determine whether the asserted ground is 
present. See Jackson v. Indiana, supra. Neither party objected to the 
jury instruction defining treatment. There is, accordingly, no occasion 
in this case to decide whether the provision of treatment, standing alone, 
can ·ever constitutionally justify involuntary confinement or, if it can, how 
much or what kind of treatment would suffice for that purpose. In its 
present posture this case involves not involuntary treatment but simply 
involuntary custodial confinement. 
11 / 
See, e.g., Sarbin, The Scientific Status of the Mental 
Illness Metaphor, in Changing Perspectives in Mental Illness 1 (S. Plog & 
R. Edgerton eds.); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications 
for Civil Commitment, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 75, 80. See also, Develop-
ments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 
1190, 1254-1256. 
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12/ 
- See note 5 supra. 
13/ 
Upon remand, the Court of Appeals is to consider only 
the question whether O'Connor is to be held liable for monetary damages 
for violating Donaldson's constitutional right to liberty. The jury found, 
on substantial evidence and adequate instructions, that O'Connor deprived 
Donaldson, who was dangerous neither to himself nor to others and was pro-
vided no treatment, of the constitutional right to liberty. Cf. note 8 supra. 
That finding needs no further consideration. If the Court of Appeals holds 
that a remand to the District Court is necessary, the only issue to be 
determined in that court will be whether O'Connor is immune from liability 
for monetary damages. 
Our decision vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals de-
prives that court's opinion of precedential effect, leaving this Court's 
opinion and judgment as the sole law of the case. Cf. United States v. 
Munsingv.rear, 340 U.S. 36. 
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I propose to add the following to note 5 on page 13: 
During his years of confinement, Donaldson unsuc-
cessfully petitioned the state and federal courts for 
release from the Florida State Hospital on a number 
of occasions. None of these claims was ever re-
solved on its merits, and no evidentiary hearings 
were ever held. O'Connor has not contended that he 
relied on these unsuccessful court actions as an 
independent intervening re~son for continuing 
Donaldson's confinement, and no instructions on this 
score were requested. 
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